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"Creativity and the Global Knowledge Economy is an important work of intellec-
tual synthesis as well as a significandy original contribution to the global conver-
sation about the contemporary economic and social significance of knowledge. 
The authors address key practical questions of the changing role of knowledge 
in the so-called post-industrial society. They also critically interrogate the rheto-
ric of the knowledge economy. This book is a comprehensive overview of the 
origins of the key debates, and at the same time sets an exciting agenda for fu-
ture lines of discussion and action." 
Bill Cope. Research Professor. Department of Educational Policy StUdies, College of
Education, University oflliinois at Urbana-Champaign 
''This insightful and engaging book addresses questions of pressing significance 
for educationists in the twenty-first century. Peters, Marginson and Murphy 
provide a perceptive, well-argued account of economic, politit:a1 amI intellectual 
changes under global knowledge capitalism. They highlight the importance of 
creativity, imagination and education in the growth and ongoing development of 
knowledge societies. In these uncertain times, thoughtful,~ rigorous analysis of 
the kind demonstrated in this volume is much needed. Creativity and the Global 
Knowledge Economy looks to the future while acknowledging the past. This book 
makes a valuable contribution to this growing field of research and deserves wide 
reading." 
Peter Roberts, Proftssor of Education. University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
"This is first-rate social science. Often there is a huge chasm between the proph-
ets of the 'new' and the critics who want to puncture holes in their inflated 
claims, between social theorists spinning new concepts for understanding 
changes in economy, society and culture and social scientists who want to dem-
onstrate that these zeitgeist-definers lack empirical depth or that their claims 
apply to only the few. This book cuts through those kinds of limiting debates by 
showing that the notion of a 'global knowledge economy' points to something 
real but that the term nonetheless requires unpacking and contextualization. 
Peters, Marginson and Murphy feel equally at home in the analytical world of 
Austrian economics or the sociology of post- industrialism, the discipline of 
management or the study of higher education, a discussion of creativity or the 
Web 2.0 system. They provide a material and institutional context for the ideas 
surrounding the 'global knowledge economy' and identify key carriers of this 
new social force-the 'global knowledge worker', the 'academic entrepreneur', 
the 'sojourning student', and other types of 'creative cosmopolitans' who inhabit 
the new economy." 
Eduardo de la Fuente, Communications and Media Studies, Monash University 
IINot without irony, Creativity and the Global Knowledge Economy is a creative, 
insightful survey and evaluation of the exploding theoretical and applied think-
ing about the emergence of a knowledge-based global economy and society. The 
editors and authors plumb the exciting prospects of a knowledge capitalism for 
ceaseless scientific discovery and technological innovation and for affording mil-
lions seemingly limitless opportunities for self-determination. The volume's 
chapters also brilliantly problematize both the increasingly outdated balkaniza-
tion of academic agendas and outmoded top-down corporate models that im-
pede rather than foster innovation and creative entrepreneurship. A world where 
ideas rule and where knowledge is openly and collectively arrived at and univer-
sally accessible to everyone at negligible cost challenges the assumption of scarce 
resources as insurmountable constraints on economic development and widening 
human development. This volume merits wide circulation and serious reflection 
as an important guide for understanding and designing a post-industrial world." 
Edward A. Kolodziej: Director, Center for Global Studies, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
"This book, the first of a proposed trilogy, represents a fascinating interdiscipli-
nary collaboration across education, political economy, the arts and technology 
studies. It identifies a new phase of the Iknowledge economy,' which the authors 
call the 'creative economy.' This refers to a context in which the capacity for in-
vention and innovation becomes itself a strategic priority for business and for so-
ciety generally. What is creativity? Where does it come from? How can it be 
fostered, for individuals and for productive organizations? These questions, the 
authors suggest, have become paramount in a globally competitive environment. 
But, cases of individual genius aside, the endeavors of consciously teaching, 
planning, and managing creativity give rise to a number of paradoxes, which the 
authors trace out in a variety of educational and workplace settings, because 
creativity is multidimensional and unruly. How individuals and learning organi-
zations manage these paradoxes will determine their competitive advantage for 
the future." 
Nicholas C. Burbules, University of Illinois 
"Michael A. Peters, Simon Marginson and Peter Murphy deconstruct neo-
liberal accounts of the knowledge economy. In so doing, they traverse a vast 
array of the scholarly literature on knowledge's relationship to economic devel-
opment and broader social arrangements and suggest possible ways forward for 
more creative modes of knowledge production and dissemination, for the uni-
versity and enlightenment commitments to social progress." 
Bob Lingard, &hoolof Education, The University of Queensland 
>--
E 0 
~
-
c 0 
+
'"
 
m
 
u
 
.
-
.
.a
 
L
U
 
>
 
0 
O
J 
-
.
-
19 
0
)
+
'"
 
"
"
'0 
to 
O
J 
O
J 
.
.
.c 
-
Q) 
+
-
' 5 
:.. 
"
"
'0 
0 
U 
c 
c 
m
 
~

Michael A. Peters, Simon Marginson, 
and Peter Murphy 
Creativity 
and the Global 
Knowledge Economy 
~ 
PETER LANG 
New York· Washington, D.C.lBaltimore· Bern 
-Frankfurt am Main · Berlin · Brussels · Vienna · Oxford 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
Peters, Michael A. 
Creativity and the global knowledge economy / 
Michael A. Peters, Simon Marginson, Peter Murphy. 
p.cm. 
Includes bibliographical references and index. 
1. Intellectual capital. 2. Creative ability-Economic aspects. 
I. Marginson. Simon. II . Murphy, Peter. ITl. Tide. 
HD53.P48 303.48'33-dc22 2008033858 
ISBN 978-1-4331-0425-1 (hardcover) 
ISBN 978-1-4331-0426-8 (pap"back) 
Bibliographic infonnation published by Die Deutsche Bibliothek. 
Die Deutsche Bibliotheklists this publication in the "Deutsche 
Nationalbibliografie"; detailed bibliographic data is available 
on the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.del. 
Cover design by Sophie Boorsch Appel 
Cover photo, Otways National Park, Australia Ganuary 2008) 
by Simon Marginson 
The pap~ in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability 
of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity 
of the Council of Library Resources. 
00 
© 2009 Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York 
29 Broadway, 18th £loor, New York, NY 10006 
www.petcrlang.com 
All rights reserved. 
Reprint or reproduction, even partially, in aU forms such as microfllm, 
xerography, microfiche, microcard, and offset strictly prohibited. 
Printed in the United States of America 
Contents 
Preface 
Acknowledgements 
Introduction: Knowledge Goods, the Primacy of Ideas and the 
Economics of Abundance 
Michael A. Peters 
1. Defining Knowledge Capitalism 
Peter Murphy 
2. Education and the Knowledge Economy 
Michael A. Peters 
3. Academic Entrepreneurship and the Creative Economy 
Michael A. Peters and Tina CA. c.) Besley 
4. Intellectual Freedoms and Creativity 
Simon Marginson 
5. Education, Creativity and the Economy of Passions 
Michael A. Peters 
6. 'Creativity and Knowledge Economies 
Peter Murphy 
VII 
,x 
23 
51 
71 
9 1 
125 
149 
VI I CONTENTS 
7. University Rankings and the Knowledge Economy 
Simon Marginson 
8. Sojourning Students and Creative Cosmopolitans 
Simon Marginson 
9. Managing Paradox in a World of Knowledge 
Peter Murphy and David Pauleen 
Aboutthe Authors 
Index 
185 
217 
257 
277 
281 
Preface 
This is the first book of a trilogy on creativity, the imagination and the knowledge 
economy that was conceived among the three of us-Peters, Murphy and 
Marginson-all Antipodeans, but working in different disciplines, countries and 
institutions. Creativity and the Global Knowledge Economy is soon to be followed by 
Glohal Creation: Space, Mohility and Synchrony in the Age of the Knowledge Economy, 
with Simon Marginson as lead author, and Imagination: Three Models of Imagination 
in the Age of the Knowledge Economy, with Peter Murphy as the lead author. Each 
work is the result of genuinely collaborative endeavour and records different 
emphases that are systematically related to set themes and inquiries. 
The trilogy will provide a comprehensive view not only of the role and sig-
nificance of creativity and imagination in the global knowledge economy but also 
of the importance of education-and, in particular, higher education-to the 
process of endless innovation in what has been called the 'creative economy'. 
Creativity and innovation is all we have, in the face of the accumulating crises 
of our time, in which financial instability, credit crisis, staggering production, and 
sudden fluctuations in oil prices and in all measures of value compound the larger 
and longer term global problems of environment, energy and poverty. Only new, 
creative approaches to knowledge, to the organization of knowledge, and the free 
exchange of ideas can solve those problems. Certainly, the notions of creativity 
and imagination in the global digital knowledge economy indicate a greater respect 
VIII I PREFACE 
for 'openness' as an attitude and ontology for individuals, epistemologies and 
institutions that might provide the technological infrastructure and springboard 
for innovative approaches and fresh thinking about the nature of distributed 
knowledge systems and the effective exchange of scholarly information, especially 
in relation to the generalized energy and food crises that bedevil the poorest more 
than the rich nations. 
We hope that the three related volumes of this trilogy will provide the software 
for a reprogaming of our knowledge institutions and policies that might embody 
the best of an Enlightenment spirit projected into uncharted futures. 
Michael A. Peters 
San Bernardino, California 
August 2008 
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Introduction: Knowledge 
Goods, THE Primacy OF Ideas 
AND THE Economics OF 
Abundance 
MICHAEl A. PETERS 
What information consumes is rather obvious. It consumes the attention of its 
recipients. H ence, a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention. 
-HERBERT SIMON 
Higher education has been transformed in the past decade and will continue to 
change apace in the next decade. The development of the knowledge and learning 
economies emphasizes the changing significance of intellectual capital and tacit 
knowledge in the forms of human, social and intellectual capital for economic 
growth and development. The 'symbolic' or 'weightless' economy has highlighted 
the general importance of symbolic, immaterial and digital goods and services 
for economic and cultural development and resulted in new labour markets with 
a demand for higher analytic skills and new markets in tradable knowledges. 
Developments in communication and information technologies have contributed 
to various forms of globalization, changing the format, density and nature of the 
exchange and flows of knowledge. The digitization, speed and compression of 
communication have reshaped delivery modes in higher education, reinforced the 
notion of culture as a symbolic system and led to the spread of global cultures as 
knowledge and research networks. 
These developments have been noted for some time, and over the past fifty 
years many terms have been used to describe the development of the 'knowledge 
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economy' or to note aspects of its developing tendencies. The term itself first 
emerged and its use stabilized with the 1996 OECD report The Knowledge-Based 
Economy. It is possible to distinguish a number of different strands and readings 
of the knowledge economy and important to do so because it provides a history of 
a policy idea and charts its ideological interpretations. We can distinguish a 
number of different strands in economics and sociology that followed early attempts 
by Friedrich von Hayek (1936; 1945) to define the relations between economics 
and knowledge: 
1. economic value of knowledge studies by Fritz Machlup (1962) of the 
production and distribution of knowledge in the U.S.; 
2. Gary Becker's (1964; 1993) analysis of human capital with reference to 
education; 
3. an emphasis on 'knowledge workers' by the management theorist Peter 
Drucker (1969) who coined the term in 1959 and founded 'knowledge 
management'; 
4. Daniel Bell's (1973) sociology of postindustrialism that emphasized the 
centrality of theoretical knowledge and the new science-based industries, a 
shift from manufacturing to services and the rise of a new technical elite; 
5. Alain Touraine's (1971) The Post- industrial Society hypothesized a 
'programmed society' run by a 'technocracy' who control information and 
communication; 
6. I\.1ark Granovetter's (1973; 1983) theorizing of the role of information in 
the market based on weak ties and social netvvorks; 
7. Marc Porat (1977) defined 'the information society' for the U.S. 
Department of Commerce; 
8. Alvin Toffler (1980) talked of knowledge-based production in the 'Third 
Wave economy'; 
9. Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard (1984) defmed The Postmodern Condition as an age 
marked by the 'incredulity towards metanarratives' and David Harvey (1989) 
talked of the large-scale shifts from Fordist to flexible accumulation; 
10. James Coleman's (1988) analysis of how social capital creates human 
capital and the development and applications of related notions by Pierre 
Bourdieu (1986) and Robert Putnam (2000); 
11. the standard or received business model associated with knowledge 
management prevalent in the 1980s became an established discipline in 
1995 (Stankosky, 2004); 
12. Paul Romer (1990) argued that growth is driven by technological change 
arising from intentional investment decisions where technology as an 
input is a nonrival, partially excludable good; 
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13. the 'new economy' readings of the decades of the 1990s (Delong et aI., 
2000; Stiglitz, 2003; Hubner, 2005); 
14. the OECD's (1994) influential model based on endogenous growth 
theory uses the term 'knowledge-based economy'; 
15. Joseph Stiglitz (1998; 1999) developed the World Bank's Knowledge for 
Development and Education for the Knowledge Economy based on knowledge 
as a global public good; 
16. 'the learning economy' developed by Lundvall (1994; 2001, with Johnson; 
2006, with Lorenz); 
17. the digital or 'weightless' economy proposed by Danny Q;.ah (2003) 
and others; 
18. the 'global information society' based on the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS)' ; 
19. postmodern global systems theory based on network theory, after Manuel 
Castells (1996; 2006); 
20. public policy applications and developments of the 'knowledge economy' 
concept (Rooney et aI., 2003; Hearn & Rooney, 2008). 
It is an important intellectual task not only to provide a chronological order 
for these readings but also to recognize the force of different political values and 
assumptions in their public policy applications. Clearly, not all conceptions of 
the knowledge economy ~re based on neoliberal fundamentals; some predate 
neoliberalism, and others provide a critique of neoliberal conceptions of 
globalization. In large measure, the two discourses of the economics and socio-
logy of knowledge are parallel and separate (see Peters & Besley, 2006), with the 
former focusing on the mode of production and the latter its distribution and 
stratification effects. 
The work of Daniel Bell and Alain Touraine and other sociologists cannot be 
described in neoliberal terms, nor can that of the economists Stiglitz, Romer, 
Lundvall. and Qyah, yet they address similar objects of study even if they 
understand them differently and describe the reality from different disciplinary 
perspectives using different methodological tools. While Machlup's conception 
bears the mark of the Austrian school-he completed his thesis under the guidance 
of Ludwig von Mises-Stiglitz is better considered 'new Keynesian' and Romer 
has been described as 'a post-scarcity prophet.'2 The important point to note here 
is that the 'knowledge economy' is not simply or solely an ideological policy 
construction; it points at some real phenomena that have to be described, analyzed 
and explained. Although it is important to acknowledge the ideological dimen-
sions of the 'knowledge economy' as a policy construction that is used to mobilize 
public funds and to help develop an underlying economic metanarrative about the 
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future of advanced liberal states, at the same time it is also necessary to be able to 
appreciate what is new and different about the knowledge economy as a mode of 
economic organ ization. One characteristic that runs through the literature in both 
economics and sociology from the early studies of Machlup and Bell to the 
revolutionary economic thinking of Romer is the centrality of theoretical 
knowledge (or 'the primacy of ideas') as a source of innovation and the importance 
of basic science and science-based industries. In the empirical literature this has a 
number of strands, including the discussion of the knowledge-intensiveness of 
different industry sectors (Kochan & Barley, 1999) and the role of learning and 
continuous innovation inside firms (Drucker, 1993; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; 
Prusak, 1997). 
Walter W. Powell and Kaisa Snellman (2004) document the transition 
underway in advanced industrial nations from an economy based on natural 
resources and physical inputs to one based on intellectual assets 'with patent data 
that show marked growth in the stocks of knowledge, and show that this 
expansion is tied to the development of new industries, such as information and 
computer technology and biotechnology', but they warn tha t 'one cannot assume 
that there is a natural link between knowledge production and flexible work, as 
new information technologies open up novel possibilities for both discretion and 
control' (p. 215). 
Although there are different readings and accounts of the knowledge economy, 
it was only when the OEeD (1996) used the label in the mid-1990s and it was 
adopted as a major policy description/prescription and strategy by the United 
Kingdom in 1999 that the term passed into the policy literature and became 
acceptable and increasingly widely used. The 'creative economy' is an adjunct 
policy term based on many of the same economic arguments-and especially the 
centrality of theoretical knowledge and the significance of innovation. Most 
definitions highlight the growing relative significance of knowledge compared 
with traditional factors of production-natural resources, physical capital and 
low-skill labour-in wealth creation and the importance of knowledge creation as 
a source of competit.ive advantage to all sectors of the economy, with a special 
emphasis on R&D, higher education and knowledge-intensive industries such as 
the media and entertainment. At least two sets of principles distinguish knowledge 
goods, in terms of their behaviour, from other goods or commodities or services; 
the first set concern knowledge as a global public good; the second concern the 
digitalization of knowledge goods. 
These features have led a number of economists to hypothesize the 'knowledge 
economy' and to picture it as different from the traditional industrial economy, 
leadjng to a structural transformation. 
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KNOWLEDGE AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD 
The first set of principles concerning knowledge as an economic good indicate 
that knowledge defies traditional understandings of property and principles of 
exchange and closely conforms to the criteria for a public good: 
1. knowledge is non-rivalrous: the stock of knowledge is not depleted by use, 
and in this sense knowledge is not consumable; sharing with others, use, 
reuse and modification may indeed add rather than deplete value; 
2. knowledge is barely excludable: it is difficult to exclude users and to force 
them to become buyers; it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrict 
distribution of goods that can be reproduced with no~or little cost; 
3. knowledge is not transparent: knowledge requires some experience of it 
before one discovers whether it is worthwhile, relevant or suited to a 
particular purpose. 
Thus, knowledge at the ideation or immaterial stage considered as pure ideas operates 
expansively to defy the law of scarcity. It does not conform to the traditional criteria 
for an economic good, and the economics of knowledge is therefore not based on 
an understanding of those features that characterize property or exchange and can-
not be based on economics as the science of the allocation of scarce public goods. 
Of course, as soon as knowledge becomes codified or written down or physically 
embedded in a system or process, it can be made subject to copyright or patent and 
then may be treated and behave like other commodities (Stiglitz, 1999). 
DIGITAL IN FO RMATION GOODS APPROXIMATE PURE THOUGHT 
The second set of principles apply to digital information goods insofar as they 
approximate pure thought or the ideational stage of knowledge, insofar as data 
and information through experimentation and hypothesis testing (the traditional 
methods of sciences) can be turned into justified true belie£ In other words, digital 
information goods also undermine traditional economic assumptions of rivalry, 
excludability and transparency, as the knowledge economy is about creating 
intellectual capital rather than accumulating physical capital. Digital information 
goods differ from traditional goods in a number of ways: 
1. Information goods, especially in digital forms, can be copied cheaply, so 
there is little or no cost in adding new users. Although production costs 
for information have been high, developments in desktop and just-in-time 
6 I MICHAEL A. PETERS 
publishing, together with new forms of copying, archiving and content 
crcation, have substantial ly lowered fixed costs. 
2. Information and knowledge goods typically have an experiential and 
participatory element that increasingly requires the active co-production 
of the reader/writer, listener and viewer. 
3. Digital information goods can be transported, broadcast or shared at low 
cost, which may approach free transmission across bulk communication 
networks. 
4. Since digital information can be copied exactly and easily shared, it is 
never consumed (see Morris-Suzuki, 1997; Davis & Stack, 1997; Kelly, 
1998; Varian, 1998). 
The implication of this brief analysis is that the laws of supply and demand that 
depend on the scarcity of products do not apply to digital information goods. 
Danny C21lah (2001) of the London School of Economics indicates that the 
economic importance of knowledge can be found in examples where deployment 
of machines has boosted economic performance, such as in the Industrial 
Revolution. By contrast, he talks of the 'weightless economy' 'where the eco-
nomic significance of knowledge achieves its greatest contemporary resonance' 
and suggests it comprises four main elements: 
1. information and communications technology (lCT), the Internet; 
2. intellectual assets-not only patents and copyrights but also, more broadly, 
brand names, trademarks, advertising, financial and consulting services, 
and education; 
3. electronic libraries and databases, including new media, video 
entertainment and broadcasting; 
4. biotechnology-carbon-based libraries and databases, pharmaceuticals.3 
Elsewhere, he argues: 'Digital goods are bitstrings, sequences of Os and Is, that 
have economic value. They are distinguished from other goods by five character-
istics: digital goods arc nonrivalrous, infinitely expansible, discrete, aspatial, and 
recombinant' (C21lah, 2003, p. 289). 
C21lah (2001) also has been innuential in suggest ing that knowledge 
concentrations spontaneously emerge in space, even when physical distance and 
transportation costs are irrelevant. The dynamics of spatial distributions manifest 
themselves in convergent clusters. This is an important featute, especially given 
the development of the e-conomy first in Silicon Valley and thereafter in a number 
of new geographic dusters in other parts of the world. 
]. Bradford DeLong (2000; 2002), former Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Economic Policy in the U.S. Department of the Treasury, provides an analytic 
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overview of the digital economy that conveys how different it is from the market 
economy of orthodox economics. He likens the digital economy to the enclosure 
of the common lands in early modern Britain, which paved the way for the 
Agricultural and Industrial revolutions. Digital commodities, he maintains, do 
not behave like the standard goods and services of economic theory. The store of
music tracks is not diminished when one downloads a track from the Internet, and 
a consumer does not know how good software is before purchase or indeed how 
its successor versions will perform in the future. 
These features have led a number of prominent economists to hypothesize 
the emergent 'knowledge economy' as an economy that represents a structural 
transformation from the industrial economy. 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY AS STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION 
In The Economics of Knowledge (2004) Dominique Foray argues: 
Some, who had thought that tbe concepts of a new economy and a knowledge-based 
economy related to more or less the same phenomenon, logically concluded 
that the bursting of the speculative high-tech bubble sealed the fate of a short-
lived knowledge-based economy. My conception is different. I think that the term 
'knowledge-based economy' is stilJ valid insofar as it characterizes a poss£blt scenario 
of structural transformaticns oj cur tconcmits. This is, moreover, the conception of 
major international organizations such as the World Bank and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (p. ix, my emphasis) 
In this scenario 'the rapid creation of new knowledge and the improvement of 
access to the knowledge bases thus constituted, in every possible way (education, 
training, transfer of technological knowledge, diffusion of innovations), are factors 
increasing economic efficiency, innovation, the quality of goods and services, and 
equity between individuals, social categories, and generations'. H e goes on to argue 
that there is a collision between two phenomena-'a long-standing trend, reflected 
in the expansion of "knowledge-related" investments' and 'a unique technological 
revolution' 
The collision bctween these two phenomena has spawned a unique economy, 
characterized essentially by (1) the accelerating (and unprecedented) speed at which 
knowledge is created and accumulated and, in all likelihood, at which it depreciates 
in terms of economic relevance and value as well as (2) a substantial decrease in 
the costs of codification, transmission, and acquisition of knowledge. This creates 
the potential for a massive growth of knowledge flows and externalities. Indeed, the 
strength of such externalities (and hence the importance of the problems they pose) 
is historically dependent on technological and organization. (p. x) 
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Although it remains contentious and open to question, there is enough 
agreement among leading economists and world agencies to adopt Foray's structural 
eansformation scenario as a working hypothesis. It is a productive hypothesis 
through which to highlight differences between readings of the knowledge 
economy and to profile the importance of education at all levels-basic education 
that constitutes the Millennium Goals of the United Nation's ~Education for AU' 
programme and the role of higher education in such a structural transformation. 
It also raises the political question of whether the discourse of the knowledge 
economy is distinct from versions of neoliberalism, the neoliberal project of 
globalization, and the extent to which it is compatible with a more benign social 
democratic version of the knowledge economy-or alternatively whether any of 
these political labels are salient in the latest phase of capitalism. 
In The Future of Economic Growth: As New Becomes Old, Robert Boyer (2004) 
traces the collapse of the 'new economy' to propose a novel interpretation of the 
dynamism of the U.S. economy during the 19905, prophetically arguing that the 
diffusion of information and communication technologies is part of an economic 
success story that also requires an understanding of the transformation of the 
financial system, the reorganization of the management of firms and the emergence 
cf a new policy mix. H e outlines the significance of an emergent anthropogenetic 
mode/built upon inves tments in health, education, training and leisure that despite 
being tied to arguments about the formation of social and human capital, growth 
theory and the importance of technological innovation, permits the possibility of 
combining economic efficiency with social justice, as is demonstrated to some 
extent by the Nordic countries. 
IVIKI NDMICS AND TH E LONG TAIL 
Don Tapscott and Anthony Williams begin their bestselling book Wihinomics 
(2007) with the following assertion: 
While hierarchies are not vanishing, profound changes in the nature of technology, 
demographics, and the global economy are giving rise to powerful new models of 
production based on community, collaboration, and self~organization rather than on 
hierarchy and coouo1. (p. 1) 
T he 'blogosphere' rules, and in the 'wiki workplace' employees engage in peer-
to-peer collaboration, driving the process of innovation; customers become 
'prosumers' co-creating goods and services; new supply chains are emerging where 
risk is distributed; and smart new web companies harnessing the new architectures 
for collaboration focus on the new ethos of participation and openness with the 
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aim of realizing real value for participants. Wikinomics is a book about 'the art and 
science of peer production', as they authors explain in the opening chapter: 
Due to deep changes in tech nology, demographics, business, the economy, and the 
world, we are entering a new age where people participate in the economy Like never 
before. This new participation has reached a tipping point where new forms of mass 
collaboration ace changing how goods and services are invented, produced, marketed, 
and distributed on a global basis. (p. 10) 
This is certainly true of Google, MySpace, Facebook, YouTube, Linux, 
Wikipedia, Amazon.com and eEay, which utilize the principles of mass 
collaboration. The claim of Tapscott and Williams is that these organizations are 
1:he leading edge of a revolution and that a 'new economic de!TIocracy is emerging 
:n which we all have a lead role' (p. 15). The new promise of collaboration will 
harness peer production to provide the most efficient use of intellectual resources in 
a system of collective intelligence that will eventually displace-or at least 
modify-traditional hierarchical forms of corporate organization as the main engine 
of wealth creation. As the author argue: 'The new art and science of wikinomics is 
based on four powerful new ideas: openness, peering, sharing, and acting globally. 
These new principles are replacing some of the old tenets of business' (p. 20). 
This is the world of wikinomics. The rest of Taps coot and Williams' book is 
a series of case studies designed to demonstrate these new principles and a series 
of business models that include peer pioneers, ideagoras, prosumers, New 
Alexandrians, platforms for participation, global plant floor and wiki workplace. 
Not everyone agrees. In a perceptive review of the book, Christian Fuchs 
(2008) argues that wikinomics 
is not only a subtle form of exploitation of unpaid labour, but also an ideology. The 
main idea is to outsource labour to globally distributed customers and collaborators 
that act as prosumers so that labour and other costs are reduced .... With the rise of 
Wikinomics, exploitation expands to the realm of spare time, economic colonization 
and instrumental reason become universal, and the rate of exploitation increases 
because prosumers, as a tende ncy, deliver unpaid surplus value. (p. 4) 
Fuchs goes on to argue: 
Most of the authors' Web 2.0 accumulation strategies are based on the notion of {he 
cost-cutting effects of the globa l outsourcingoflabour, supported by the Internet. In 
reality, th is strategy has the form of a new sdf-employment. which already in (he 
past produced precarious forms offlexibil ity with more risks, less social security, and 
less secure employment. The most probable result of an economy based on Wikinomics 
will be an increase in precarious and unpaid labour that benefits certain companies 
that exploit unpaid labour. (p. 5) 
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He concludes that Tapscott and Williams have an idealistic and unrealistic view of 
capitalism, and he notes that mass collaboration has traditionally been associated 
with socialist self-management and the emergence of the cooperative economy. 
As Fuchs (2008) rightly points out, 'Web 2.0 is characterized by the antagonism 
between the digitally networked productive forces and the generalized capital-
ist relations of production' (p. 6). This is an antagonism he suggest that leads to 
exploitation and alienation (see Fuchs, 2008b). At the same time he admits that 
there are actual examples of social media and peer-based commons production 
that transcend 'the instrumental10gic of competition and instrumental reason and 
anticipate a society that is based on cooperation, sharing, and participation (p. 8). 
H e also refers to accounts by Atton (2004). Barbrook (1998; 1999; 2007), Benkler 
(2006). Lessig (2006) and Soderberg (2002) that argue for anti-capitalist potential 
or for the social democratic potential of public goods inherent in the Internet. 
Chris Anderson (2006)-author of The Long Tail' Why the Future of Business 
I s Selling Less of More and editor of Wired magazine-deals with many of the 
same themes as Tapscott and Williams. H e summarizes the argument in the 
following way:4 
The theory of the Long Tail is that our culture and economy is increasingly shifting 
away from a focus on a relatively small number of 'hits' (mainstream products 
and markets) at the head of the demand curve and toward a huge number of niches 
in the tail. As the costs of production and distribution fall, especially online, there 
is now less need to lump products and consumers into one-size-fits-all containers. 
]n an -era without the constraints of physical shelf space and other bottlenecks of 
distribution, narrowly-targeted goods and services can be as economically attractive 
as mainstream fare. 
The long tail is based on the 'economics of abundance', a phrase Anderson uses 
seemingly without being aware of its previous usages. He quotes a variety of sources, 
including venture capitalists and media commentators, to indicate that the basic 
shift has been from media companies as distributors (based on scarcity) to self-
publishing (based on the economics of abundance). In one of his blogs.' he defines 
economics as the 'the science of choice under scarcity' and argues that economists 
do not know how to approach or conceptualize 'abundance', H e blogs: 
Abundance thinking-understanding the implications of'practically free'- is a core 
competence of our age, It brought us everything from the iPod ('what jf storage were 
so cheap you could put your entire music collection in your pocket?') to Gmail ('why 
should you ever have to delete an email?'), Most truly disruptive technologies disrupt 
because they take a scarcity assumption and, thanks to some technology chat generates 
abundances, simply turn it on its head. 
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Yet Anderson seems blissfully unaware that the 'economics of abundance' has 
a history. He does mention the extropians, named after efforts by Max More 
and Tom Bell in the later 1980s metaphorically to describe a system's self-
organizational intelligence or vitality. Mostly, the championing of the concept 
recently has come from Chris Anderson and technorati embellishing Anderson's 
'long-tail economics', Much of this can be described as a beat-up on abundance 
without evidence or testing or indeed much serious thought. 
Post-scarcity as a concept has existed for a while, not only in science fiction 
to describe economic and political systems where goods are freely distributed 
according to egalitarian principles but also by sociologists such as Anthony Giddens 
to point to trends in advanced industrial societies, by scientists who emphasize the 
benefits of nanotechnology with an abundance of raw materia! and self-replicating 
technologies and by digital technologists who point to zero cost in reproducing 
and sharing mass copies or to the examples of open source, open access, open 
archiving and open publishing movements. 
Post-scarcity economics of abundance has its historical antecedents in 
mutualism and the economics of robots (Albus, 1976, orig. 1927); the automated 
control of production (Douglas, 1922; MacBride, 1967); economic democracy and 
social credit (Douglas, 1992,orig. 1921; 1967); Robert Theobald's (1971) The 
Challenge of Ahundance; Stuart Chase's (1934) The Economy of Ahundance; various 
accounts of anarchism (Berkman, 1929; Bookchin, 1971); democratic industrial 
management theory, including employee ownership (Kelso, 1986; Kelso & Hetter, 
1968); anthropological studies of the economics of other cultures and so-called 
primitive affluence (Benedict, 1959; Firth, 1965; Sahlins, 1972; Lee, 1979); 
anti-work manifestos or abolition of work (Black, 1986a, b) or The Right to be Lazy 
(Lafargue, 1989) or In Praise of Idleness (Russell, 1932) or The End of Work (Rifkin, 
1995); Technology Jor the Common Good (Shuman & Sweig, 1989), technological 
optimism and cybercultural revolution (Hilton, 1966; Esfandiary, 1970); peace 
studies and the end of the 'nuclear nightmare' (Melman, 1961; Speiser, 1984); and 
discussions of poverty, unemployment and the concept of property (Theobald, 
1966; Miller, 1994; Pierson, 1996; Wilson, 1996)' 
All these works that comprise the tangled post-scarcity literature are unabash-
edly utopian and left-wing rather than pro-capitalist, right-wing or committed to 
market distribution. Yet there are anarcho-capitalist or libertarian utopias as well 
(Rothbard, 1962; Nozick, 1974; Von Mises, 2005). Many prominent Silicon Valley 
figures (Mark Pincus, Scott McNealy, Craig Newmark, John Gilmore, 
T. J. Rodgers, Peter Thiel) have been techno-libertarians. Both left-wing and 
right-wing styles of utopia have their roots in Romanticism. Although all 
market utopias steadfastly insist on the idea of scarcity, without which the idea of 
pricing would be redundant, anarcho-capitalism supposes its own notion of 
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abundance-the abundance of time. Libertarian capitalist utopias assume 
unlimited time to make individual decisions. Correspondingly, free information 
aids better decision making and thus more perfect markets. Google is an ideal 
instrument to achieve perfect information and ensure ideally functioning markets 
filled with rational choosers. In contrast, anarcho-anti-capitalist utopias typically 
think of abundance in terms of unlimited time for the free play of the imagination. 
They are inspired by Johan Schiller rather than William Godwin. But both left-
wing and right-wing conceptions of post-scarcity may be wrong. It is not clear that 
human beings, under any conceivable conditions, have unlimited time to make 
decisions. Indeed, as economies move faster and faster, and produce more and more 
information that is cheaper and freer, that is less and less true. Time for decision 
making shrinks rather increases. It is also not clear that time for the free play of 
the imagination has increased, could markedly increase or at least could ever be 
unlimited. Time is scarce, and it grows scarcer by the day as the tempo of life 
increases. As some things become freer (information notably), other things seem 
in fact to be less free and more governed by necessity. 
To draw an analogy: Google's servers provide a public good-that is, the good 
of free information. But all public goods come with a price, in this case the cost 
of Google's servers and all the servers linked to them. The unit cost of server 
storage may decline every year, but it is still a cost, and it is not zero-price. The 
cost may be disguised-it may be subsidized or paid for by Google advertising-
but it is still a cost that has to be borne. My iPod may store several years' worth of 
non-stop listening, and this storage may be relatively inexpensive compared with 
vinyl-era turntable media and technologies, but what often goes unnoticed is the 
large amount of individual management rime needed to burn, classify and order 
the audio files on a digital music player. The same applies ro the economy of 
free time: it is not free in the sense of cost-free or time-free. Many of the most 
vaunted examples of peer production thrive on the voluntary labour of amateurs 
or on the labour of professionals who are willing to gift their time to a public 
enterprise. A gift, though, is never without cost, whether the cost is measured in 
terms of time or of matter. To pur it another way: rhe free rime of the imagination 
is scarce, and utopia notwithstanding, will remain scarce. In more brutal terms, it 
has an opportunity cost: if I spend voluntary time contributing to an online 
encyclopaedia, that is also time forgone that I could have spent with my spouse, 
on helping the committee for my sports club solve its problems or else on painting 
my unveiled masterpiece. 
In short, time of all kinds, including creative time, is limited. Time is on 
nobody's side. Digitization docs make a difference to economic and social 
behaviours, but it does not eliminate the limit of time. Digitization has trans-
formed, and it continues to reshape, the mode of production and distribution. 
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It puts science and technology, knowledge creation and transmission, information 
acquisition and university education, in a leading social position. This is not pre-
sumptively either a good or a bad thing-and neither does it change everything 
about the world. It creates new inequalities as it creates new equalities. It forges 
new problems as it solves old ones, and it underscores old realities, such as the 
limits of time, in the same instant that it produces the new realities of making and 
consuming that we all have to live with, whether for better or for worse. 
THE ORGAN IZATION OF TH IS BOOK 
This book investigates the emerging complex relationships between creativity, 
design, research, higher education and knowledge capitalism. Today, there is a 
strong renewal of interest among politicians and policymakers worldwide in the 
related notions of creativity and innovation, especially in relation to terms such as 
'the creative economy', 'knowledge economy', 'enterprise society', 'entrepreneurship' 
and 'national systems of innovation'. In its rawest form, the notion of the creative 
economy emerges from a set of claims that suggest that the industrial economy 
is giving way to the creative economy based on the growing power of ideas and 
virtual value-the turn from steel and hamburgers to software and intellectual 
property (IP). In this context, policy increasingly latches onto the issues of copy-
right as an aspect of IP, piracy, distribution systems, network literacy, public 
service content, the creative industries, new interoperability standards, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the development agenda, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and trade, and the means to bring creativity 
and commerce together. At the same time, this focus on creativity has exercised 
strong appeal to policymakers who want to link education more firmly to new 
forms of capitalism, emphasizing how creativity must be taught, how educational 
theory and research can be used to improve student learning in mathematics, 
reading and science, and how different models of intelligence and creativity can 
inform educational practice. Under the spell of the creative economy discourse 
there has been a flourishing of new accelerated learning methodologies, together 
with a focus on giftedness-the design of learning programmes for exceptional 
children. One strand of the emerging literature highlights the role of the creative 
and expressive arts, performance, aesthetics in general and the significant role of 
design as an underlying infrastructure for the creative economy. 
In the past twenty years we have moved from the post-industrial economy to 
the information economy to the digital economy to the knowledge economy to the 
'creative economy'. This book tracks the most recent mutation of these serial 
endeavours to find a political economic label for the times, the notion of ' creative 
14 I MICHAEL A. PETERS 
economy'-which was pioneered by John Howkins and Richard Florida early this 
decade and has become associated with post-market notions of open source public 
space. The book summarizes the underlying-and essential-trends in knowledge 
capitalism and examines the normative mission behind these conceptions. We 
suggest that the creative economy is an enlargement of its predecessors. It democ-
ratizes creativity and relativizes intellectual property law. It also emphasizes the 
social conditions of creative work. The notion of entrepreneurship, as interpreted 
originally by Schumperer, breaks out of its business origins to become a rubric for 
larger transformation, a set of infrastructural conditions enabling creative acts. 
Likewise, the endogenous growth theory devdoped simultaneously by Paul Romer 
and others in economics has opened a space for the primacy of ideas and has 
installed continuous innovation as mainstream DEeD economic policy-and 
CEO practice. It is early days, but it seems that these moves have brought to the 
forefront forms of knowledge production based on the commons and driven by ideas 
not of profitability per se- or a new rdationship between knowledge and economy. 
What is taking place raises questions not just of 'knowledge management' but of 
the design of 'creative institutions' embodying new patterns of work. 
Our book builds on the latest research understandings and draws material 
from a range of fields to provide a synoptic reading of the field that will be of 
interest to practicing policy analysts, managers and corporate business as well as 
to graduate students and academics across a range of disciplines. The work focuses 
on a set of powerful and recent changes to the nature of the knowledge economy. 
It is a general one that nevertheless pays strong attention to context, to existing 
literatures in a variety of fields and to recent developments in the nature of 
knowledge capitalism. 
Chapter 1 exaI?ines contemporary forms of capitalism that have the arts and 
the sciences as their basis. It highlights the role of civics in forging modes of intel-
lectual capitalism and the specific nature of their rationality and spatiality. The 
chapter discusses the role of creativity and designing intelligence in intellectual 
capital modes of production and the socioeconomic implications of the latest form 
of capitalism. In the late twentieth century, especially in the United States, there 
was a visible shift away from the vertically integrated network organization to 
horizontal peer-based models. This coincided with the spread of networked 
computing and computer-mediated communications. The shift was due to the 
need of knowledge-based organizations to re-engineer their command-and-control 
style of management. Intellectual value and good technology were best created by 
collaborative, open and peer systems of working. This chapter discusses the 
'Detroit model' characteristic of the earlier era of Fordism and the shift to more 
participatory models based on collective action, developed through the commons 
and based on civic-aesthetic rather than market or command relations. 
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Chapter 2 is an essay in the new political economy of knowledge and 
information. It adopts 'knowledge capitalism' and 'knowledge economy' as over-
arching concepts that denote a sea change in the nature of capitalism. It seeks to 
understand this change through reference to economic theories of knowledge and 
information. The term 'knowledge capitalism' emerged only recently to describe 
the transition to the 'knowledge economy', characterized sometimes in terms of the 
'economics of abundance', the 'annihilation of distance', the 'de-territorialization of 
the state' and investment in human capital. This chapter reviews the field of the 
economics of knowledge beginning with Friedrich Hayek before focusing on three 
different accounts of knowledge capitalism: the OECD's New Growth Theory, 
the World Bank's 'Knowledge for Development' and Burton-Jones' account of 
knowledge capitalism as a new generic form. The chapter ends with a note on the 
concept of'knowledge cultures'. 
Chapter 3 explores the relationships among several notions: the 'creative econ-
omy', New Growth Theory and the primacy of ideas, academic entrepreneurship 
and the new paradigm of cultural production. Broadly conceptualized, the creative 
economy links the primacy of ideas in both arts and sciences in a more embedded 
and social framework of entrepreneurship. This positions education as central 
because its institutions are the primary knowledge institutions that provide the 
conditions for the transmission and development of new ideas. Entrepreneurship 
develops within networks that use new information and communication tech-
nologies. The role of the arts, humanities and social sciences becomes re-profiled 
as crucial in the generation of new ideas within the creative economy, moving 
discussion and analysis away from a single focus on the 'hard sciences' towards 
the 'artsciences' (Edwards, 2008). Nanotechnology is a good example of this 
emergent field. 
Chapter 4 reviews the constituents of intellectual creativity- particularly the 
imaginative radical-critical leaps or 'breaks' in knowledge. It discusses three 
intersecting levels or domains in which creative work takes place, with the main 
emphasis falling on the fust two of these elements: (1) the head-space of the 
self-determining creative individual or group, in the light of forms of freedom, 
particularly as discussed by Amartya Sen and F. A. Hayek; (2) the organizational 
and institutional setting of creative work, and notably the techniques of account-
ing and audit that constitute the New Public Management in the contemporary 
university; and (3) the impact of city, regional and national location on creativity. 
There is no doubt that the more complete is the element of self-determination, the 
capacity for exercising the will, the larger is the scope for creative intellectual work 
and independent imagining. The striking aspect of the contemporary university 
is the manner in which the potentials of academic creativity on one hand are 
constantly opened and enlarged according to the logic of post-scarcity on the other, 
16 I M ICHAEL A. PETERS 
criss-crossed by organizational requirements and behavioural controls that draw 
from and reproduce continuing scarcity of time and money. 
Chapter 5 discusses education, creativity and the 'economy of passions' and 
contrasts two accounts of creativity: 'personal anarcho-aesthetics' and the 'design 
principle'. The former is the dominant model-and has a close fit to business, 
often as a form of 'brainstorming', 'mind-mapping' or 'strategic planning'. This 
highly individualistic model emerged in the psychological literature at the turn of 
the twentieth century from sources in German idealism and Romanticism. It 
emphasizes the way in which creativity emerges from deep subconscious pro-
cesses, involves the imagination, is anchored in the passions, cannot be directed 
and is beyond the rational control of the individual. The 'design principlc'-in 
contrast to the first, individualistic model-is both relational and social. This 
second account is more recent and tends to emerge in literatures that intersect 
sociology, economics, technology and education. It surfaces in related ideas of 
'social capital', 'situated learning' and 'peer-to-peer' accounts of commons-based 
production. It is seen to be a product of social and networked environments-that 
is, rich semiotic environments in which 'everything speaks'. It is also a product 
of systems design that allows a high degree of interaction, and it rests on 
principles of distributed knowledge and collective intelligence. This chapter 
traces the genealogies of these two contrasting accounts of creativity and their 
significance for educational practice before showing how both notions are strongly 
connected in accounts of new forms of capitalism that require creativity in the 
curriculum. 
Chapter 6 indicates that knowledge economies are the most powerful in the 
world and asks what makes them possible. This chapter discusses the origin of 
knowledge in patte.rn thinking and aesthetic forms. In addition, the chapter notes 
the concentration of knowledge economies in specific geographic zones-
principally in portal city regions. These various phenomena are confluent: the art 
cultures of portal cities, and their intense concentrations of designing intelligence, 
contribute to the long-term accumulation of knowledge in these places. There is 
a strong parallel between aesthetic culture and the demands of long-distant 
portal economies. Aesthetic form lends itself to the management of social and 
economic uncertainty; it facilitates the discovery of pattern in the midst of chaos. 
Powerful economies arise out of the ability to manage high levels of contingency 
and risk-and avoid potential chaos. Portal cities, characterized by high levels of 
import and export, arc among the most proficient users of pattern forms to manage 
contingency successfully. These cities, and their firms and organizations, use 
pattern thinking and designing intelligence to make sense of massive information 
flows and to obviate the risks inherent in operating in environments characterized 
by high levels of change and rapid shifts in direction. 
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Chapter 7 tracks the explosive growth of the knowledge economy and open 
source production through the circuits of the research universities. The universities 
are now being transformed into a worldwide competition of networked institu-
tions, operating according to converging goals and similar methods, under the 
auspices of cross-border researcher mobility, publication/citation metrics and, 
above ali, university rankings. Just as the US News and World Report ranking has 
shaped the development of U.S. higher education as a quasi-economic status 
market, so in a short time global ranking has proven to be a potent technology for 
arranging status, assigning value to it and shaping behaviours. The fecund growth 
of knowledge goods underlies their public good character and the inability of 
neoliberal policies of commodification and trade in intellectual property to capture 
those goods, as is increasingly recognized in OECD policies on research and 
innovation1 which now place priority on the free and open dissemination of 
university-created knowledge. Yet public goods are also readily annexed to the 
longer-standing projects of producing university status and sustaining an imperial 
global geopolitics of knowledge. Here the relationship between status production 
and free cultural production is not so much a contradiction as an antinomy. Where 
the antinomy turns feral is when status production begins to over-reach itself 
by taking universal forms. These issues are discussed in the light of the social, 
economic and cultural dynamics of the flourishing and fall of the lowland city-
states of the Maya in Mesoamerica, a notable example of a status economy and the 
interplay between status reproduction and cultural goods. The chapter reviews 
the specific rankings technologies, led by the Shanghai Jiao Tong University 
research metrics, including their effects in shaping the research imagination, the 
global strategies of university executives and national policies on universities 
and research, and the aggregation of these effects in the emerging 'arms race' in 
investment in innovation. 
Chapter 8 reviews the field of intercultural and international education in the 
light of accelerated global student mobility, the greater scope for agent-directed 
trajectories in the open source setting and the resulting politics ofinterculturality. 
The chapter works through the different strands of research/scholarship in 
international education, focusing particularly on the emergent constructions of 
mobility and international student agency, and the ongoing debates about 
identity and culture. It also provides the beginnings of a theorization of globally 
inflected international education as a process of seIf-formation, focusing on tools 
of multiplicity, hybridity and self-centring in the identity-forming strategies of 
student agents. In the past fifty years the main body of research on international 
education, and especially on intercultural relations as expressed in pedagogy 
and counselling in higher educational institutions iri the English-speaking world, 
has been informed by psychology. The strengths of psychology as a bounded 
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and quantitative discipline potent in the normalization of behaviour within 
monocultural admin istrative systems have increasingly emerged as limitations in 
the light of global evolution, which valorizes openness, contingency and multiple 
and fluid identity. In the past two decades a second strand of work has emerged, 
informed by social, cultural and political theory and focused on global convergence 
and the implications for self-determining human agents. This morc eclectic body 
of research and scholarship is focused on a range of readings of cosmopolitanism, 
from portfolios of the desired 'intercuLtural competences', to theories of mcta-
national detachment (,globalism'), to notions of agency both locally/nationally 
competent and imag ining freely across global space. The chapter closes with 
surmise about the future evolution of knowledge about international education. 
Chapter 9 discusses the successful management of creative employees in 
organizations that rely extensively on the development of intellectual capital. 
These organizations must incorporate new thinking-and to do so must be able 
to manage the ambiguous cognitive and practical situations that arise in such 
contexts. The chapter explores and highlights several areas of current interest in 
management and global business, including social capital and intellectual capital, 
creativity and innovation, and arts firms and aesthetic management. Specifically, 
it links the development and maintenance of intellectual capital in large 
knowledge-forming organizations to the successful management of paradox. The 
chapter highlights numerous areas where the management of creative employees 
often clashes with traditional management practices. These areas include crossing 
organizational boundaries, rules around the use of personal and organizational 
time and space, locus of authority and freedom to think. The chapter suggests that 
managing paradox requires special knowledge and skills, key among which are 
ironic knowledge, trust of those who are out of sight, acceptance of ambiguity in 
thought and action, and pattern thinking. 
NOTES 
I would like to thank Peter Murphy and Simon Marginson for constructive commems on this 
chapter and for contributing chapter summaries. Perer Murphy also added two substantial 
paragraphs on anarcho-capitalist or libertarian utopias. 
1. Sec the website at http://www.itu.int/wsisiindex.html (accessed 6th September, 2008). T he 
W SIS initiated its fi rst phase in 2003 producing a Declaration of Principles and Plan of 
Action. 
2. See Reason online at http://www.reason.com/news/show/28243.html(accessed 30 August, 
2008). 
3. I have taken this characterization from hi s webpage on the weightless economy at http:// 
ccon.lsc.ac.uk/staff/dquah/ tweirlO.html (accessed 30 August, 2008). 
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4. See his website at www.thelongtaiLcom/about.html (accessed 30 August, 2008). 
5. See www.thelongtaiLcom/the_long_tailI2006/111morc_oo_the_eeo.htmI(accessed 
30 August, 2008), 
6. These references come from the reading list 'The post-scarcity ecor.omies/culture of abun-
dance' at http://web.archive.org/web/20060512163521/http:llwww.pa:.msu.edu/pcoplel 
mulhaU/mistiPSE-COA.html (accessed 30 August, 2008). 
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